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DISCUSSION 
THE OBJECTIVITY OF A METHODOLOGY* 
MICHAEL MARTIN 
Boston University 
In this paper I consider critically Richard Rudner's account of the objectivity of 
a methodology. I show that Rudner's analysis provides neither a sufficient condi- 
tion nor a necessary condition for one method being more objective than another. 
1. Rudner's Account of Objectivity. 'Objectivity' can be predicated of people, 
sentences, methods, and so on. Rudner, in his book Philosophy of Social Science,1 
considers several of these different uses of 'objectivity' and gives an account of 
what it means to say that one method is more objective than others. A method, 
according to Rudner, is the logic or criteria of justification which provides the 
rationale by which sentences are accepted or rejected. According to Rudner one 
method is more objective than another if it is more reliable than the other and a 
method is more reliable than another if its continued employment is less liable to 
error than the continued employment of the other method. Rudner explains that 
one method is less liable to error than another if it is less likely to result in its users 
continuing to believe or coming to believe false sentences than is the other method. 
Given this account of objectivity Rudner argues that a method is maximally 
reliable if it minimizes the likelihood of error more than the alternatives and a 
method is absolutely reliable if it makes error impossible. Now Rudner argues 
that no method of empirical inquiry is absolutely reliable in this sense. Conse- 
quently scientific method is not absolutely reliable. However he maintains that the 
course of history shows that scientific method is maximally reliable in terms of 
other methods. According to Rudner this is because of the self-correcting nature 
of scientific method: no hypothesis is ever immune from revision and the con- 
tinued application of scientific method will make it likely that false hypotheses 
will be eliminated. 
I do not want to question Rudner's contention that scientific method is the 
most objective method or his explanation of this obiectivity. I will argue that 
Rudner's account of objectivity is not adequate. First, I will show that there are 
some methods clearly less objective than scientific method which turn out to be 
more objective on Rudner's account. Rudner's view at least needs supplementa- 
tion. Hence, his account is not a sufficient condition for the objectivity of method. 
Secondly I will show that there are certain historical methods which may be more 
objective than other historical methods and yet do not meet his definition. Hence 
his account does not provide a necessary condition of the objectivity of method. 
* Received November, 1972. 
1 Richard Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1966), 
pp. 73-83. 
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2. The Problem of Cautious Methods. Rudner's definition of objectivity with 
respect to methods is this: 
(1) A method A is more objective than a method B if and only if the use of 
method A is less likely than method B to result in its users continuing to be- 
lieve, or coming to believe, false sentences. 
Consider, for example, a methodology that would entail that one should not 
believe or disbelieve any synthetic sentence. Let us call this methodology, a method 
of extreme caution. This method would be more reliable than scientific method 
given Rudner's definition for users of this method neither continue to believe 
nor come to believe any synthetic statement. Hence they would not continue to 
believe or come to believe any false synthetic sentence. Consequently a method 
of extreme caution would be absolutely reliable and thus it would be more ob- 
jective than scientific method. But that this method is more objective than scien- 
tific method is clearly absurd. Hence there must be something wrong with (1). 
Now the above criticism may be thought to be unfair to Rudner. Clearly, it 
might be said, Rudner is thinking of a method in which people do believe or dis- 
believe some synthetic sentences. Undoubtedly he is, although this is not explicitly 
stated in his writing. Taking this supposition into account we can reformulate 
his definition thus: 
(2) A method A is more objective than method B if and only if (a) the use of 
A is less likely than method B to result in its users continuing to believe, or 
coming to believe, false sentences and (b) the users of method A continue to 
believe and come to believe some synthetic sentences and the users of method 
B continue to believe and come to believe some synthetic sentences. 
But (2) still has problems. For consider a methodology which would entail that 
one should not believe any sentence except a sentence with a probability equal to 
or greater than 0.9999999. Let us call this methodology, a method of moderate 
caution. Suppose that there are sentences which meet this restricted requirement. 
This method would be more objective than scientific method for it is surely the 
case that a method of moderate caution would be less likely to result in its users 
coming to believe or continuing to believe false sentences than would scientific 
method which on any plausible formulation would allow belief in more speculative 
and less well established hypotheses. Consequently a method of moderate caution 
would be more objective than scientific method. But this again seems wrong and 
suggests that (2) is not an adequate account of the objectivity of method. 
On Rudner's account of objectivity scientific method is less objective than more 
cautious methods. On these methods one should either believe no synthetic sen- 
tence or believe synthetic sentences only under the most stringent conditions. This 
suggests a way out of the problem. Popper and other methodologists have stressed 
the importance of bold speculative hypotheses in science. The cautious methods 
we have considered rule out belief in such hypotheses. Perhaps the objectivity of 
scientific method consists in the reliability of scientific method with respect to 
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bold and speculative hypotheses. This consideration suggests the following defini- 
tion: 
(3) Method A is more objective than method B if and only if (a) the use of 
A is less likely than method B to result in the users of A continuing to believe 
or coming to believe false sentences and (b) the users of A and B continue to 
believe and come to believe bold and speculative sentences. 
This definition certainly has advantages over the others for it seems to eliminate 
both a method of extreme caution and a method of moderate caution as being 
more objective than scientific method since neither of these methods allow belief 
in bold speculative theories and hypotheses. Whether (3) provides a sufficient 
condition for the objectivity of method is another question which we will consider 
later. In any case, it is clear that Rudner's account must be supplemented to provide 
a sufficient condition for the objectivity of method. 
3. The Problem of Distorting Omissions. Now condition (a) in definition (3) 
above is not a necessary condition for the objectivity of a methodology. For one 
method could be more objective than another and yet not be more reliable in 
Rudner's sense. Consider two historical methods HM1 and HM2 which provide 
criteria of evaluating historical accounts. Now these historical accounts can be 
thought of as complex sets of sentences about the past. HM1 and HM2 thus pro- 
vide the rationale for accepting or rejecting these accounts. 
Let us suppose that the two methods are used to evaluate different accounts of 
the histories of various countries. Let us also suppose that HM1 is a little more 
reliable than HM2 in Rudner's sense; it is slightly less likely that the use of HM1 
will result in historians believing or coming to believe false sentences contained in 
these histories than that the use of 11M2 will. However, although historians using 
HM1 will be a little less likely to have false beliefs than historians using HM2 it 
is possible that historians using HM1 would be much more likely to believe ac- 
counts of history with gross omissions, accounts which leave out crucial social 
political movements, battles, people and dates; in sum, accounts which although 
perhaps containing all true sentences provide a distorted picture of history. On 
Rudner's account one seems to be forced into saying that HM1 is more objective 
than HM2, despite the gross bias that might result from HM1 in contrast to HM2 
simply because HM1 is a little more reliable than HM2. However, the contrary 
seems to be the case. HM2, although slightly less reliable than HM1, would pre- 
systematically be considered more objective than HM1 because its use resulted 
in less distorting omissions. Consequently, condition (a) in definition (2) above 
does not provide a necessary condition for one method being more objective than 
another. 
Now it might be argued against the above criticism that so long as it is true and 
about the period under investigation what is included in a historical account can 
not be decided on methodological grounds. Clearly not all true sentences about, 
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e.g. English history can be included in a history of England and selection accord- 
ing to one's purposes and interest is required. No doubt this is so. Selection is 
essential in what is included in historical accounts. But given certain purposes 
certain omissions are distorting while other omissions are not. For example a 
historian who wrote a history of England with a special emphasis on the courage 
of the English people during time of war which contained no sentences about the 
English people's reaction to the Nazi bombing of England during World War II 
would be guilty of a serious omission, an omission that is seriously distorting. 
Consequently a methodology whose use would result in a historian accepting this 
history may well be considered less objective than some other methodology. On 
the other hand a historian with the above purpose who wrote a history of England 
and did not include sentences describing the change in Englishmen's hats from 
1800-1900 would not be guilty of a distorting omission and a methodology which 
resulted in the acceptance of historical accounts with such omissions would not 
because of this, at least, lack objectivity. 
4. Rudner's Account Revised. The above criticism also shows that (3) above can- 
not provide a sufficient condition for the objectivity of a methodology. Historical 
method 11M1 can meet (a) and (b) in (3) but may not be as objective as historical 
method HM2. Use of HM1 may make it much more likely than the use of HM2 
that accounts with distorting omissions will be accepted although use of HM, 
is a little less likely than HM2 to result in its users believing false sentences. Hence 
HM1 would not be as objective as 11M2. 
In the light of this criticism one might suggest a further modification in Rudner's 
definition of the objectivity of a methodology: 
(4) Method A is more objective than method B if and only if (a) the use of A 
is less likely than method B to result in the users of A continuing to believe, 
or coming to believe, false sentences and (b) the users of A and B continue to 
believe or come to believe bold and speculative sentences and (c) the use of 
A is less likely than the use of B to result in the users of A believing accounts 
with distorting omissions. 
However, these modifications will not do and we have already seen why. Condi- 
tions (a), (b), and (c) may well provide a sufficient condition for the objectivity 
of a methodology. But (a) is not a necessary condition. For similar reasons (c) 
is not a necessary condition. Consequently (4) fails. 
Whether a set of necessary conditions can be formulated for the objectivity of 
method is a question we will not consider. However, the above considerations 
suggest the difficulty in doing so. 
